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Abstract 
Understanding value stability and change is essential for understanding values of both 
individuals and cultures. Yet, theoretical thinking and empirical evidence on this topic have 
been scarce. In this paper we suggest a model outlining processes of individual value change. 
This model proposes that value change can occur through automatic and effortful routes. We 
identify five facilitators of value change (priming, adaptation, identification, consistency 
maintenance, and direct persuasion), and consider the moderating role of culture in each. In 
addition, we discuss the roles of culture, personal values, and traits as general moderators of 
value change. Evidence on the structure of value change and the effects of age on value 
change are also reviewed.  
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 Values are usually viewed as “relatively stable” (e.g., Rokeach, 1973, p. 11). 
Although the word relatively implies that values can change, the emphasis in the 
psychological literature has been on value stability, resulting with little theoretical thought 
and empirical research on value change (see also Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). Indeed, some of 
the literature reports only minimal change in values (e.g., Feather, 1975; Lubinski, Schmidt, 
& Benbow, 1996; Schwartz, 2005). Yet other empirical evidence suggests that individual 
values can change more substantially (e.g., Kohn & Schooler, 1982; Rokeach, 1973; Sheldon, 
2005). Hence, it is important to consider value change in a theoretical manner that might 
stimulate empirical research. The current paper proposes a model of such change. We begin 
by introducing values and defining value change. We address methodological issues in 
studying this topic. We then propose a model of value change and consider facilitators of 
value change; the structure of value change; and moderators to the process of value change 
including culture, personal values, and personality traits. 
Values  
 We introduce values focusing on value characteristics used later in this article. Values 
convey what is important to people in their life (e.g., achievement, security). They guide 
perception, goals, attitudes, and behavior (reviewed, e.g., in Bardi, Calogero, & Mullen, 
2008; Maio, 2010; Roccas & Sagiv, 2010). Hence, values serve as motivators, similarly to 
needs (e.g., Schwartz, 2004). They are ordered in a personal hierarchy of importance, and the 
location of a value in that hierarchy determines perception and behavior (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; 
Schwartz, 1992).   
 As suggested by many (e.g., Kluckhohn, 1951; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1992), values probably develop as a joint product of the individual’s needs, 
traits, temperament, culture, socialization, and personal experiences (see supporting evidence, 
e.g., in Calogero, Bardi, & Sutton, 2009; Knafo et al., 2008; Kohn & Schooler, 1982; Roccas 
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et al., 2002; Schwartz, 2004; Verkasalo, Goodwin & Bezmenova, 2006). Unlike needs and to 
some extent also traits, there is an element of choice in values (Roccas et al., 2002). That is, 
people may actively decide how important certain values are to them.  
 Values are viewed as central aspects of the self (e.g., Brewer & Roccas, 2001; 
Rokeach, 1973), and hence are expected to be less amenable to change than attitudes and 
needs (see, e.g., Konty & Dunham, 1997). Maio (2010) views them as mental representations 
and Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) defined them as cognitive structures (beliefs) that can be 
retrieved from memory when needed. Hence, people know what their values are and they can 
be measured directly by asking people to rate their importance. This is similar to the 
understanding of attitudes. Still, values may often operate without consciousness (Schwartz, 
1996). For example, people may behave according to their values without being consciously 
aware of the motivating force of their values at the time of action (see Bardi & Schwartz, 
2003). 
Types of Value Change and their Assessment 
We employ a phenomenological definition of value change, based on the notion 
above that people know what their values are, hence values can be measured by asking 
people directly to rate their values. We therefore define value change as a change in the 
importance of a value, evident in a change in the rating or ranking of a value on a 
questionnaire. This can be a short-term (temporary) change, such as in the response to an 
experimental manipulation, or a long-term change.  
 Drawing on work in personality change (see, e.g., Biesanz, West, & Kwok, 2003; 
Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005), it is possible to address different types of changes in values, 
mainly mean level changes and intra-individual changes. Mean level changes in values refer 
to changes in the average value importance in a population. For example, Hofmann-Towfigh 
(2007) has found in a longitudinal study with adolescents in Germany that power and 
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achievement values became more important whereas benevolence and universalism values 
became less important over the course of a school year. Such research designs are typically 
analyzed by ANOVA, regression, or structural equation modeling, depending on the research 
question. If they are conducted over a number of times of assessment they can be analyzed 
using hierarchical linear modeling and growth curve models (see detailed explanation in 
Biesanz et al., 2003). 
A weaker but still somewhat valid design for studying mean level changes in values is 
the comparison of values of matched samples across times. For example, Verkasalo et al. 
(2006) compared the values of matched groups of Finnish school children and university 
students before and after the 9/11 attacks. They found an increase in the importance of 
security values and a decrease in the importance of stimulation values in the aftermath of the 
attacks. Most of the research on value change has been done using matched samples.  
 Mean level changes in values as a function of age have also been studied by 
correlating age with values (Schwartz, 2005). Yet, a threat to internal validity in this design is 
the possibility that age differences in values may be a result of societal events that have 
occurred at some points in time (e.g., wars) and have affected the values of a certain cohort 
(see more detailed discussion in Schwartz, 2005). Hence, the observed age differences may 
not reflect age per se but cohort differences. 
A second type of value change is intra-individual change (also termed rank order 
change/stability). This type of change refers to individual differences in value change, 
creating changes in the rank order of individuals on the importance of a certain value. For 
example, if the importance of achievement values increases for some and decreases for 
others, then the order of participants on a continuum of these values changes. This type of 
change is often analyzed by longitudinal correlations (test-retest), and may also be analyzed 
using intra-class correlations. However, caution should be used in interpreting these 
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correlations, as they are influenced by the internal reliabilities of the value indexes. Values 
typically differ in their internal reliabilities. For example, in the Schwartz Value Survey 
(Schwartz, 1992) universalism values tend to have relatively high internal reliabilities 
whereas tradition values tend to have relatively low internal reliabilities (see Schwartz, 2005). 
Hence, a high longitudinal correlation of universalism values compared with a lower 
longitudinal correlation of tradition values may simply stem from their differences in internal 
reliability.  
It is also possible to consider both types of change in the same analysis. Biesanz et al. 
(2003) explain how to conduct such statistical analyses. This possibility has never been 
employed in research on value change.  
Forces that Foster Value Stability and Proposed Routes to Value Change 
 Janoff-Bulman (1989) conceptualized world-views and their change in terms of 
schemas and schema change. Building on his ideas, we suggest that value change can be 
understood in a similar way. Specifically, as values are cognitive structures that function as 
central aspects of the self, they can be understood as central schemas with an over-arching 
effect on perceptions, goals, attitudes, and behaviors (see also Feather, 1975; Hitlin & 
Piliavin, 2004). Central schemas are generally resistant to change because people tend to 
forget events that are incongruent with their schemas, remember better events that are 
congruent with their schemas, and reinterpret events to fit their existing schemas (see reviews 
in, e.g., Cooper & Shallice, 2006; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). Therefore, values are likely to be 
generally resistant to change. Moreover, it has been suggested that values often operate as 
‘truisms’ (Maio & Olson, 1998). That is, people often hold values that they do not think 
about in depth. As they do not devote much thought to their values, they do not normally 
challenge their values, rendering values as stable by default. 
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 Still, previous research suggests that values do change sometimes. How might this 
happen? The rationalization above implies that value change involves schema change. 
Similarly to the understanding of attitude change (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986), value change may result from both automatic and effortful processing. 
We next outline the routes we suggest to value change, illustrated in Figure 1. We suggest 
two main routes to value change – an automatic route and an effortful route. We separate 
between processes that lead to the initial value change (phase 1 in the figure) and processes 
that lead to long-term value change (phase 2 in the figure). Paths with dashed lines indicate 
routes that occur only under certain conditions, as we explicate below. Facilitators to each 
route are portrayed in dashed boxes with arrows that point to the routes through which they 
operate. 
Routes to Initial Value Change (Phase 1) 
 Figure 1 presents the model we propose for value change. As values are stable by 
default, we suggest that an event might start the process of change. Hence, the process of 
value change is likely to start with environmental cues, represented in the figure by an oval to 
distinguish this external event from all other events in the figure. Environmental cues can 
either automatically prime certain values without much awareness to the prime, or they can 
bring to awareness a challenge to the existing values.  
 The automatic route to initial value change. Building on the idea of values as 
schemas and the spreading activation model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), certain environmental 
features may be associated in memory with certain values (e.g., the English language may be 
associated with individualistic values). An environmental cue (e.g., hearing English) may 
prime a certain schema thereby leading to a response to the event using this schema. This 
primed schema may include values that the individual does not hold as particularly important 
(e.g., individualistic values), but at the time of activation these values may affect response to 
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the event due to the activation of the schema. To illustrate, a newcomer from a collectivistic 
culture who recently arrived to an individualistic country is offered by her local flat mate to 
go to a pampering spa. As the offer is communicated in the local language, it automatically 
activates individualistic values such as hedonism rather than security values that would lead 
to considerations of costs. This automatically strengthens the links of schemas that include 
hedonism values. The automaticity of this process enables initial value change, because the 
potential for resistance to value change is minor.  
The effortful route to initial value change. Environmental cues may directly invoke 
thinking about values. This may lead people to challenge their values, re-evaluate their 
importance, and as a result possibly change them. Hence, this route to value change involves 
awareness and effortful processing. Maio and Olson (1998) indeed found that making people 
elaborate on the reasons for their values induces value change. This effect was later 
established in many experiments (reviewed in Maio, 2010). 1 However, values that were held 
with established cognitive support did not change, as people were able to elicit counter 
arguments for the value-change messages (see Maio, 2010). Because in this route people are 
aware of the possibility of value change they may resist this change and therefore prevent it. 
Thus, challenging values may be a pre-requisite for the effortful route to value change but is 
not sufficient. Moreover, value challenging may not always lead to thinking about the value, 
as people may reject the value-challenge message immediately. This may happen if 
challenging the value poses a great threat to the individual (such as challenging tradition 
values for an extremely devout person). Therefore, this path in Figure 1 is portrayed as a 
dashed line to indicate a route that occurs only under certain conditions. 
In Maio’s (2010) research, participants are typically asked to write reasons for their 
values, and this brings values to awareness, causing people to actively challenge their values. 
In real life, such value challenging may occur as a result of a direct value message such as in 
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the media, in education, or coming from any other socialization agent (parents, peers, etc). To 
illustrate, Krishnan (2008) suggested that the university MBA program conveys an 
application-oriented approach that could challenge students’ existing values. And indeed, two 
longitudinal studies following MBA students throughout their studies revealed an increase in 
self-enhancement values and a decrease in self-transcendence (pro-social) values (Krishnan, 
2008). 
The literature on attitude change suggests that direct persuasion messages often result 
in resistance (reviewed in Aronson, 1999). With regard to values, there is likely to be even 
more resistance than with attitudes, because values are more central to the self-concept (see 
Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Rokeach, 1973). For this reason, we believe that most of the value 
change is not due to direct persuasion attempts. More successful ways in which the effortful 
route to value change may operate are outlined below in discussing facilitators of value 
change. 
 From the automatic to the effortful route to initial value change. As can be seen in 
Figure 1, the automatic priming of a value may result in actively thinking about the value. 
This may happen if the cue is very strong or occurs repeatedly. It may increase the salience of 
the value to such an extent that would cause awareness of the value (for various levels of 
automaticity see Bargh, 1994). For example, a cultural prime such as role expectations may 
lead to actively thinking about the implications of such role expectations to one’s core values. 
Such contemplation may result in value change. Hence, a process that started as automatic 
may continue with awareness leading to an effortful route to value change.  
Routes to Long-Term Value Change (Phase 2) 
 So far we have addressed routes to initial value change. However, the resistance of 
schemas to change implies that such initial change is likely to be temporary. Because people 
do not normally think about their values they should typically operate quite automatically in 
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affecting perception and behavior. Thus, even if a single event replaced the value schema 
with another schema in interpreting an event, later on central schemas (embedding personally 
important values) are still likely to exert the main effects on perception and behavior.  
A similar process is likely to occur for the effortful route resulting from a direct 
challenging of values. Specifically, any single event might challenge values once causing a 
temporary change in values. But as life goes on and people do not constantly think about their 
values, the original values are likely to continue to operate in affecting perception and 
behavior. Hence, the default might be a temporary change in values. Still, research suggests 
that longer term changes in values do occur sometimes. Therefore, we outline below possible 
ways by which the automatic and the effortful routes to value change may operate in 
preserving the initial value change and thereby creating long-term change. 
The automatic route to preserving initial value change. We propose that for a value 
to change permanently through automatic schema change, primes leading to the same 
alternative schema need to operate repeatedly, gradually strengthening the links of the 
schema to other schemas, until the alternative schema becomes central and therefore quite 
dominant in affecting perception and behavior. Using the example of language and values, 
when a person moves to a new country the same cultural primes of the new culture (e.g., 
language) occur on a daily basis, thereby strengthening links of the initially weak schema 
related to values of the new culture. This in turn can lead to value change.  
The effortful route to preserving initial value change. For a challenge in values to 
change values permanently, values need to be challenged repeatedly in the same direction. 
After the initial effortful processing and initial value change, these similar challenges may 
remind the person about the previous conclusion of value change. With every reminder the 
value schema is likely to be strengthened until it gradually becomes stronger than the 
previous schema, resulting in long-term value change.  
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On occasion, one event of value challenging may be sufficient to cause permanent 
change in values. This could be when the initial value-challenging event has led to much 
thought, including relating the value to different life situations thereby strengthening the 
schema, resulting in deep conviction. Hence, when the person is later reminded of the value, 
he or she may remember the arguments for the value and his or her new view on it. This 
could happen after a long discussion with others regarding the value, as part of a social 
gathering or as part of an intervention program (at schools, as part of socialization to an 
organization, etc.). 
A comparison of the proposed model to dual route models of attitude change. Our 
model is similar to two well-known models of attitude change, namely the elaboration 
likelihood model that suggests the central vs. peripheral routes to attitude change (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986) and the heuristic-systematic model of persuasion (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989). 
The systematic (or central) route to attitude change is parallel to our effortful route to value 
change, as both require conscious effortful processing of relevant information in order to 
make a decision regarding the attitude or the importance of the value. The heuristic (or 
peripheral) route to attitude change is similar to our automatic route to value change in that 
they both involve primarily automatic processing. However, in the heuristic (or peripheral) 
routes to attitude change people attend to peripheral aspects of the persuasion message (such 
as attractiveness of the message conveyer) whereas in the automatic route to value change the 
actual value is activated by environmental cues. 
 
For theoretical clarity, we have discussed the automatic and the effortful routes 
separately. Yet in practice, both processes might occur concurrently as we specify below. In 
addition, each person may experience some value change through the automatic route and 
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some through the effortful route. We elaborate on these ideas further as part of discussing 
processes of value change instigated by specific facilitators of change.  
Facilitators of Value Change  
 We review five facilitators suggested in the literature as instigating value change: 
priming, adaptation, identification, consistency maintenance, and direct persuasion attempts. 
Last, we discuss age, not as a value-change facilitator per se, but as a factor affecting the time 
in which value changes are more probable. At the end of addressing each facilitator we 
suggest possible ways in which culture may moderate the processes linked with each 
facilitator. We end this section with suggestions for general moderators of value change 
including culture and individual differences in values and traits. Each of these facilitators 
may affect both intra-individual value change and mean-level value change. Specifically, if 
the process occurs only in some individuals, intra-individual value change is likely to occur. 
However, if the process occurs in the same way for an entire group of people (e.g., most 
immigrants change values in the same direction) mean level changes will be observed. 
Priming Processes  
We proposed that automatic schema change is likely to occur through repeated 
priming of an alternative schema (see Figure 1). An example is in research on priming 
individualism and collectivism. In a laboratory experiment, American and Chinese 
participants engaged in a task focused on thinking in terms of ‘I’ or ‘we’ and were presented 
with a story in which a person made a decision based on considerations of achievement 
(reflecting individualistic values) or family obligations (reflecting collectivistic values) 
(Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999). Participants then completed the Schwartz Value Survey 
(SVS; Schwartz, 1992). These primes led to higher mean-level importance of individualistic 
values in participants who were primed with an individualistic mind-set and higher mean-
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level importance of collectivistic values in participants who were primed with a collectivistic 
mind-set.  
According to Bond and Yang (1982), language can prime culture, as well. And 
indeed, the mean-level effect reported above was also achieved by simply completing the 
SVS in different languages. Specifically, Chinese participants fluent in English who 
completed the SVS in English prioritized individualistic values more than those who 
completed the SVS in Chinese (Ralston, Cunniff, & Gustafson, 1995).  
Research on biculturalism is also informative here. Hong, Morris, Chiu, and Benet-
Martínez (2000) suggested that biculturals (individuals who identify with two cultures) have 
two alternative interpretative schemas that reflect the two cultures they identify with. They 
found that environmental cues that symbolise one culture lead to interpretations that 
correspond with this culture, thus implying that cultural cues can activate the interpretative 
schema of this culture. Cultural environmental cues can be blatant, such as flags and 
language, or more subtle, such as role expectations (Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006). 
Priming effects on values are not limited to priming culture. In a recent experiment, 
asking students in the UK to think about what it would be like to have a child resulted in 
greater mean-level importance of self-transcendence values (Maio, Karremans, Leygue, 
Gebauer, & Webb, 2008). 
These studies demonstrate a temporary change in values as a result of priming. Do 
these findings challenge the existence of a generally stable value system? The studies 
reported above used between-subject designs, hence it is impossible to assess before-after 
within-person change in values. Yet, studies on bicultural individuals have found that 
although self-reports of personality traits shifted according to cultural primes, participants’ 
rank order stability remained high (Ramirez-Esparza, Gosling, Benet-Martínez, Potter, & 
Pennebaker, 2006). As was found with regard to personality (e.g., Fleeson, Malanos, & 
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Achille, 2002), it may be more useful to think of the value system as intra-individually 
variable around a mean with some individuals potentially less variable around their personal 
mean and others showing more variability around the mean. With this rationalization, it may 
be that biculturals tend to be relatively more variable around the mean as they may shift their 
value importance more readily as a result of priming cultural ques. 
Changes in value importance as a result of a prime occurring once, however, are 
likely to be temporary. Yet if the same concept is primed repeatedly by a new life situation 
(e.g., parenthood) or by the environment (e.g., a new culture) a more permanent change in 
values may take place. This process may explain how biculturals may have acquired 
alternative interpretative schemas that correspond to their two internalized cultures, whereas 
monoculturals have only one dominant interpretative schema related to culture (see above).  
The moderation of culture. Would it make sense to expect cultural variation on the 
strength of the effect of this facilitator? Priming has been found to operate both in 
individualistic and in collectivistic cultures (see Gardner et al, 1999). Hence, we may expect 
that this facilitator would operate similarly across cultures.   
Adaptation  
Rohan (2000) suggested that life changes are likely to lead to value change. How 
might this happen? Life changes are accompanied by the occurrence of new environmental 
cues, such as a baby crying in the case of parenthood, or a new language in the case of 
moving country. We suggest that adaptation to new life situations leads to value change both 
through the automatic and the effortful routes. 
With regard to the automatic route, we outlined above the implication that research 
into priming values has on value change as part of adapting to living in a new country and 
adapting to parenthood. The same process (with different values) may occur when one enters 
another new life situation, such as a new role at work, or a new organization.  
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A new life situation may also challenge the person’s values, as previous values may 
not be adaptive in the new context. Hence, pursuit of important values may be frustrated, 
making these values salient and bringing them to awareness. This is likely to lead people to 
think about their values, which may cause value change through the effortful route. As this 
happens repeatedly, the person may reconsider holding this value and perhaps reduce its 
importance. In this context, Schwartz and Bardi (1997) suggested that people adapt their 
values to reinforcement contingencies in the environment. That is, people are likely to 
downgrade the importance of values that cannot be pursued, and they are likely to endorse 
values that are encouraged in their social environment (see also Schwartz, 2005). And indeed, 
Kohn and Schooler (1982) found in a longitudinal study that employees whose job conditions 
required self-directed work showed mean-level increase in self-directed orientation ten years 
later. Similarly, Danis, Liu, and Vacek (in press) found that inter-generational increase in 
openness to change values from before to after the communist regimes in the Czech 
Republic, and this change was attributed to the need for openness to change in post-
communist work environments. Returning to the example of the acculturating individual, 
rewards in a new culture may emphasize individual rather than collective outcomes 
(emphasizing, for example, achievement values), thereby rendering individualistic values 
more adaptive. 
 Schwartz and Bardi (1997) also suggested that this process of downgrading the 
importance of values that cannot be pursued is not likely to occur for all values. Some values 
are likely to be based on Maslow’s (1954) deficit needs (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). This is 
particularly true for security values. For these values, inability to fulfill them would not cause 
their abandonment. On the contrary, it would create greater need that would lead to an 
increase in the importance of security.  
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This process may occur through both the automatic and the effortful routes to value 
change, as illustrated in Figure 1. With regard to the automatic route, deficiency in fulfilling 
security needs is likely to prime security and lead to the interpretation of situations in terms 
of security. This, in turn, may gradually increase the importance of security values. Yet this 
process of constantly interpreting situations in terms of security may also bring security 
values into awareness, challenge the previously lower importance of security values and 
further aid the increase of their importance. Accordingly, mean level increases in the 
importance of security values as a result of reduced security were documented following the 
Oklahoma terrorist bombing in the US (Frink, Rose, & Canty, 2004), the 9/11 attacks 
(Verkasalo et al., 2006), and the bombing at the London underground in July 2005 (Goodwin 
& Gaines, 2009). 
 The basic idea that changes in life situations are likely to result in value change has 
been supported in a 2-years longitudinal study using the general population in Australia 
(Bardi, Lee, Hoffman-Towfigh, & Soutar (2009). The extent of life changing events that 
participants experienced during the two-year period was positively associated with greater 
overall intra-individual value change. Regarding a specific life change, Ferriman, Lubinski, 
and Benbow  (2009) found that the expected gender differences in values have become more 
pronounced after participants became parents, possibly as a result of adapting to their new 
life role.  
The moderation of culture. Adaptation seems to be a basic process that has been 
found across cultures (e.g., Inglehart, 2003). Hence, we expect this factor to operate similarly 
across cultures.   
Identification 
It has been suggested that values develop partly through identification (see Kasser, 
Ryan, Zax, & Sameroff, 1995). Gecas (2000) proposed that important social identities 
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become internalized in the individual as values. Similarly, values may change as a result of 
changes in identification. For example, when a person enters a new group (work-group, new 
culture, etc.) identifying with this new group may result in value change towards the group’s 
values (e.g., Mael & Ashforth, 1992). This can happen through a combination of the 
automatic and the effortful routes to value change (see Figure 1). Specifically, if people in the 
new group frequently interpret events using the same values, the new member might adopt 
these interpretations of events as a result of identifying with the group. In other words, the 
new member would start using the same alternative schema to interpret events, eventually 
resulting in the replacement of the old values with the new values. In addition, 
communication within the group might make the new value salient, and cause the new 
member to think about this value, challenge it, and possibly change its importance. Indeed, 
Chatman (1991) found value change in new employees as a result of spending time with 
mentors at work. The process of value change through identification with a new ingroup has 
been related to processes of acculturation, such as assimilation and integration (e.g., Olmeda, 
1979). 
The moderation of culture. Identification may be a weaker facilitator in 
individualistic cultures, compared to collectivistic cultures, because of the lower level of 
inter-dependency in individualistic cultures (see Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
Consistency Maintenance 
 According to Rokeach (1973), people should be motivated to resolve inconsistencies 
in their self-concept, partly through changing their values. This idea stems from principles of 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) with an additional emphasis on self-dissatisfaction 
that results from recognizing inconsistencies in the self-concept.  
Based on these ideas, Rokeach (1968) developed an intervention of value change, 
verified in many studies (reviewed in Rokeach, 1968, 1973). In this intervention, people first 
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rank their values according to personal importance. They then receive an interpretation of 
their ranking that puts them in a negative light (for example, as being selfish). This is likely 
to be inconsistent with their view of themselves. It induces self-dissatisfaction which results 
in value change. The extent of value change induced by this intervention was not affected by 
a variety of seemingly relevant factors, such as perceived validity of the information 
presented in the manipulation and acceptance of the interpretation to one’s own values 
(Rokeach, 1973). Hence, it seems that while this intervention operates through the effortful 
route of value challenging, it also initiates automatic processes of change.  
This process is similar to self-persuasion processes in attitude change, which also rely 
on principles of cognitive dissonance (see, e.g., Aronson, 1999). The basic paradigm of self-
persuasion in the attitude change literature is to ask participants to write a counter-attitudinal 
essay or prepare a counter-attitudinal speech. The idea is that people persuade themselves that 
the attitude they have expressed publicly is their true attitude, in order to avoid cognitive 
dissonance due to the inconsistency between the expressed and held attitude. Unlike the 
process in Rokeach’s (1968) intervention, in this process people do not think that they are 
changing their values. Rather, they ‘realize’ that they hold the relevant value with a different 
priority than they originally thought. This can be seen as a process of meta-cognition in 
which people engage in cognitions about their cognitions (see Wegener & Carlston, 2005). 
Self-persuasion processes in value change have been tested successfully in a recent series of 
studies (Grant & Sagiv, 2009).  
A related process based on the motivation to maintain consistency is proposed by self-
perception theory (Bem, 1967). According to this theory, people observe their behavior and 
conclude that they hold the reflected attitude. This suggests that consistent change in behavior 
can result in value change through observation of one’s own behavior. Such a process can 
occur as a combination of the automatic and effortful routes to value change. Self-observation 
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of behavior may prime a behavior-consistent schema in which the expressed value is 
embedded, which over time replaces the original schema of the values thereby causing value 
change. Regarding the effortful route to value change, violations of internal consistencies 
between values and behavior may make the value salient. This would reduce its ‘truism’ 
status and cause the person to think about the violated value. Recurrent behavior might later 
be justified in terms of the value that is directly expressed in this behavior, leading to value 
change (for the role of values as justifications of behaviors see Kristiansen & Zanna, 1994; 
Schwartz, 1992). 
This process from behavior to values can help explain changes in values due to 
adaptation to new situations. A new life situation requires new behavior, (for example, the 
laws or social-norms of a new country, behavior required by a new life role like becoming a 
parent), or by a new position at work (e.g., becoming a manager). Therefore, this suggested 
process may also contribute to the internalization of norms. 
Partly based on consistency maintenance, the links between values and related 
variables (traits, needs, goals, and attitudes) imply that, in general, we should expect that 
change in these related variables would lead to change in values and vice versa. 
The moderation of culture. Consistency between behavior and internal attributes 
(such as values) has been found to be weaker in collectivistic cultures than in individualistic 
cultures (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997, 1999). Thus, internal consistency may be a weaker 
force in value change in collectivistic cultures. In addition, with regard to the threat to 
positive self-concept in Rokeach’s (1968) intervention, in collectivistic cultures a positive 
self-concept built on individual attributes may be less important (e.g., Heine, 2003). In 
contrast, elements of the self-concept important to one’s group or relationships are very 
important, potentially acting as powerful driving forces for this intervention in collectivistic 
cultures (see, e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997). 
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Direct Persuasion Attempts   
 Perhaps the most obvious facilitator of value change is direct persuasion attempts, 
such as media messages, education programs, and programs of value socialization in 
organizations (reviewed in Chatard & Selimbegovic, 2007; Saks & Ashforth, 1997). These 
attempts are likely to induce value change through the effortful route (see Figure 1) as they 
would mainly operate by encouraging thinking about a new value. However, as stated above, 
the effortful route may also induce reactance. This has been found with regard to attitude 
change (e.g., reviewed in Aronson, 1999) but it is likely to occur even more strongly with 
regard to values, given that values are more central aspects of the self-concept. Similar to the 
findings regarding attitude change (see, e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989), attempts to change values 
are more likely to succeed for values that are weak in the self-concept (i.e., the person does 
not have a strong opinion on them), or for values that are already quite important, with the 
persuasion attempt strengthening these further.  
 The moderation of culture. Direct attempts at persuasion may be more successful in 
hierarchical cultures in which conforming to authority is more important. Hence an education 
program at school or at one’s organization may be viewed as a legitimate source of values. 
Such direct attempts may also be successful in collectivistic cultures in which the group is 
more important than the individual (see also Chatard & Selimbegovic, 2007). In collectivistic 
cultures the individual may be persuaded as part of their identification with the group. In 
contrast, in individualistic cultures and cultures that emphasize intellectual autonomy (see 
Schwartz, 2004), people are encouraged to think independently. To the extent that individuals 
are aware of such interventions, they may object to attempts to influence their thoughts in 
such settings. 
Age 
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Is it plausible to expect more value change in certain age groups than others? In the 
basic literature on life span development adolescence is considered a time of considerable 
change, undergoing biological, cognitive, and social transitions (e.g., Steinberg, 2008), 
possibly including value change. Yet there is very little research on values in adolescence, 
with the youngest ages studied typically young adults. Bardi and Schwartz (1996) have 
suggested that greater value change should be expected in young compared to older adults 
because the value system of older adults is already strongly crystallized, has many 
connections to other cognitions, and is therefore more difficult to change. In other words, the 
values of older adults are likely to be embedded in stronger and more centralized schemas.  
Indeed, in samples of East European citizens collected within a few years of the end 
of the communist regimes, effects of the communist regimes were clearly evident in samples 
of teachers but were much weaker in the younger student samples (Bardi & Schwartz, 1996). 
Similarly, there is evidence from Japan that younger males are significantly more 
individualistic than their older counterparts (see Matsumoto, Kudoh, & Takeuchi, 1996). And 
in the immigration context, young immigrants seemed to adopt the host culture’s values more 
readily compared with older immigrants (Marín, Sabogal, Marín, Oter-Sabogal, & Perez-
Stable, 1987). An analysis of cohort studies in sociology has also concluded that there is 
greater value change in younger than in older adults (Konty & Dunham, 1997). Yet, as 
discussed above, it is important to remember that value differences between cohorts could 
reflect cohort differences rather than value change within persons.  
Unlike the conclusions from cohort differences in values, in a longitudinal study on 
the general population measuring value change over two years, the correlation between age 
and overall value change was only marginal in significance, and was weaker than the effect 
of having to adapt to new life situations, suggesting that the need to adapt to new life 
circumstances is a more important factor in value change than age (Bardi et al., 2009). This 
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finding converges with evidence that changes in personality traits can occur at any age, and 
are understood as resulting from crucial life changes that require adaptation (Roberts & 
Mroczek, 2008).  
The findings on trait changes imply another way in which age might serve as a 
facilitator of value change. Specifically, age may affect value change as part of the need to 
adapt to different life circumstances that are typical to certain ages (Schwartz, 2005). For 
example, achievement values may be more adaptive in early adulthood when people build 
their career and less important later in life, particularly after retirement. Hence, the 
importance of achievement values may decline with age, as Schwartz expected and found by 
correlating values with age in a cross-sectional study.  
Current knowledge on trait changes with age may also help to derive hypotheses 
regarding value-changes with age. This is because traits are likely to affect values through the 
justification of traits with values (Roccas et al., 2002). Building on the knowledge on links 
between traits and values (Roccas et al., 2002) one may expect values related to traits to show 
the same change trajectories throughout the life span as traits. For example, across cultures, 
levels of the trait openness to experience tend to decrease from adolescence to adulthood 
(McCrae et al., 2004). Therefore, it is plausible to expect that openness to change values 
which are positively associated with trait openness (Roccas et al., 2002) would also decrease 
in importance from adolescence to adulthood.   
Similarly, because values are viewed as partly based on needs, one can hypothesize 
on age-related value change that would result from age-related changes in needs. For 
example, one might expect that the need for security increases with age and particularly 
towards late adulthood when the likelihood for health risks increases. As a result, it is 
plausible to expect that security values would increase in importance. Schwartz (2005) indeed 
expected and found a positive correlation between age and valuing security.      
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General Moderators of Value Change: Culture, Personal Values, and Traits  
 So far we have addressed the potential of culture to moderate value change induced 
by specific facilitators of change. However, it is also possible to think about culture as a 
general moderator of value change. That is, should we expect more value change, in general, 
in certain cultures compared to others? Similarly, it is possible to consider personal values, 
and traits as general moderators of any change in ideas, beliefs, attitudes, and values. We 
consider two general directions of moderators –change tendency and preservation tendency. 
 Change tendency. Some cultures and individuals are more open to the possibility of 
change. These include cultures that are high on the cultural dimensions of uncertainty 
avoidance (e.g., Hofstede, 2001), mastery, and intellectual and affective autonomy (Schwartz, 
2004). On the individual level, those who value openness to change (self-direction and 
stimulation values, Schwartz, 1992) and are high on the trait of openness to experience (e.g., 
McCrae & Costa, 1997) are more open to the possibility of change. All of these individuals 
and cultures may have a greater tendency for value change. However, these cultural 
dimensions (particularly intellectual autonomy), personal values (particularly self-direction), 
and traits also include a tendency for independent thought. The implication for value change 
would be that people from such cultures or with such values and traits are open to the 
possibility of change, but only if they feel that they have independently chosen the new value 
and after being convinced as a result of independent thought. Hence, although they are open 
to change, they may be more resistant to direct attempts to change their values. 
 Cultures that encourage change may also facilitate value change indirectly. Their 
encouragement of change implies that institutions and policies in such cultures may change 
more readily, people may change jobs and places of residence more often, and friendship 
networks and marital status may be less stable. All these environmental changes are likely to 
create new life situations that require adaptation, partly through value change. Similarly, 
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individuals with the corresponding values and traits are likely to introduce more changes to 
their lives (e.g., change jobs and relationships more readily) leading to a greater need to adapt 
to new life situations partly by changing values.  
 Preservation tendency. Certain cultures and individuals are likely to be more resistant 
to change. These include cultures high on the dimensions of embeddedness (Schwartz, 2004) 
due to their emphasis on tradition and those high on the dimension of hierarchy (Schwartz, 
2004) due to rigid societal hierarchical structure likely to hamper opportunities for social 
mobility and change. Similarly, people who value conservation (Schwartz, 1992) are 
motivated to leave things as they are. However, these cultural dimensions and personal values 
also entail deference to authority and to the ingroup. Hence, when value change is initiated by 
a higher place of authority or by the ingroup such people are more likely to change their 
values. 
The Structure of Value Change 
 What is likely to be the structure of value change? Would we expect values to change 
in isolation with one another or to change in an interdependent way, such that change in one 
value would result with changes in other values? Values exist as a system (e.g., Rokeach, 
1973; Schwartz, 1992). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that their change would not occur in 
isolation. Rokeach (1973) emphasized values as organized in a hierarchy. As a result, he 
maintained that any change in one value would lead to change in the hierarchy of the values, 
such that if one value becomes more important, other values become less important.       
Bardi et al. (2009) and Maio et al. (2009) have suggested that Schwartz’s (1992) 
rationalization for the circumplex-like structure of values can also apply to the structure of 
value change. That is, an increase in the importance of any one value should be accompanied 
by similar increases in compatible values and by decreases in the importance of conflicting 
values in order to maintain a coherent system of values. Bardi et al (2009) found empirical 
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support for this suggestion in four longitudinal studies spanning three Western countries. 
Similar effects have been shown in laboratory experiments in the UK using a version of 
Rokeach’s (1968) value change intervention (Maio et al., 2009). Similarly, asking students to 
think about having a child resulted with stronger self-transcendence values and weaker self-
enhancement values (Maio et al., 2008). Finally, longitudinal studies in India found mean 
level increases in the importance of self-enhancement values accompanied by decreases in 
self-transcendence values over the course of two years in students of management (Krishnan, 
2008). Hence the data available so far suggests that when values change, they change in an 
organized manner that mirrors the structure of values.  
  
Conclusions 
Although values have become a major topic of interest for cross-cultural 
psychologists in recent years, there has been little systematic analysis of how values might 
change over time, and the mechanisms that might underlie such change. In this paper, we 
argue that, contrary to prevalent assumptions, there is evidence of predictable value change. 
Building on work on attitude change and biculturalism, we proposed two routes to value 
change, one automatic and one effortful. We identified a series of facilitators of such change. 
These include priming processes, adaptation, identification, consistency maintenance, and 
direct persuasion. We also considered the impact of age and culture in value change 
processes, and related these processes to individual traits and needs.  
We defined value change as a change in the importance scores on a value 
questionnaire. Is this reflective of real value change? A change in value scores on a 
questionnaire could merely be the result of momentary response biases, possibly as a result of 
acute accessibility of values that were manipulated in an experiment. However, we argue that 
at the particular moment of completing the value questionnaire the participant’s experiences 
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are reflected in holding the relevant value with a changed level of importance. In the 
participant’s mind, at that moment, the value importance has changed. Hence this is a 
phenomenological way of defining value change. Instead of treating such value change as 
unreal we treat it as temporary. The same process that has led to this apparent change in 
values on the questionnaire may occur in real life and affect long-term value change if it 
occurs repeatedly. For example, changing values as a result of language change might have 
caused only a temporary change in values in the reported experiment (Ralston et al., 1995, 
discussed above), but the same process occurs repeatedly in the real life of immigrants. 
Therefore, such laboratory experiments can inform real-life processes of value change. 
Studying value change is not easy. A long-term commitment is required for 
longitudinal studies. Populations also need to be carefully selected -- most studies rely 
heavily on student populations, but such selective populations may be rather sheltered from 
effects of societal changes that might lead to the greatest changes in values. One promising 
method that overcomes these technical difficulties might be the use of archival texts such as 
newspapers. Recent studies have indeed documented meaningful value change in societies 
using such methods (e.g., Bardi et al, 2008; Nafstad, Blakar, Carlquist, Phelps, & Rand-
Hendriksen, 2007).  
 Despite the difficulties often posed by research into value change, we contend that 
understanding such change has a number of important implications. At the individual level, 
value change may be an important driver of behavior change. In cross-cultural research, 
investigators often build their studies on expectations of value differences between cultures, 
relying on the assumption that values are stable. Hence, it is important to document value 
change and understand what stimulates it.   
 In conclusion, we argue that the study of value change is an important topic of 
research for those engaged in both intra-cultural and cross-cultural studies. While researching 
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this area is not simple, such work offers important theoretical advances. Therefore, we urge 
investigators to study value change as a major topic for inclusion in their research. 
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1 We note, however, that this effect has only been studied in individualistic cultures; hence its 
cross-cultural robustness awaits support. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. Proposed model of value change. 
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